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Abstract
We present a compactly integrated, 625 MHz clocked coherent one-way quantum
key distribution system which continuously distributes secret keys over an optical
fibre link. To support high secret key rates, we implemented a fast hardware key
distillation engine which allows for key distillation rates up to 4 Mbps in real
time. The system employs wavelength multiplexing in order to run over only a
single optical fibre. Using fast gated InGaAs single photon detectors, we reliably
distribute secret keys with a rate above 21 kbps over 25 km of optical fibre. We
optimized the system considering a security analysis that respects finite-key-
size effects, authentication costs and system errors for a security parameter of
εQKD = 4× 10−9.
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1. Introduction
Today’s society relies heavily on confidential and authenticated communication. Encryption
and authentication can be realized with provable information-theoretic security, derived from
Shannon’s theory [1]. This means that even an adversary who has unlimited computing
powers can decipher an encrypted message or forge an authenticated message only with
arbitrarily small probabilities. To date, the only message encryption scheme that has been proven
information-theoretically secure [1] is the Vernam one-time pad cipher [2]. Secure message
authentication has been demonstrated for schemes utilizing universal hash functions [3, 4]. The
fundamental resources of these schemes are random and secret strings of bits, shared between
the two distant parties commonly known as Alice and Bob. Hence, information-theoretically
secure communication necessitates continuous distribution of random secret keys with provable
security. Classically, the generation of two identical key streams of truly random bits at two
distinct locations relies on the assumption of a secure channel or public-key cryptography.
However, their security is based on certain assumptions, such as the difficulty to factorize large
composite integers, or to compute discrete logarithms in certain finite groups.
A completely different approach is quantum key distribution (QKD), introduced in 1984 by
Bennett and Brassard [5] (see [6] for a review). The idea is to send random bits encoded in non-
orthogonal states of single photons. The security is based on the laws of quantum mechanics,
in particular the no-cloning theorem which forbids the creation of identical copies of unknown
quantum states and the fact that a measurement of an unknown quantum state inevitably disturbs
it. Subsequent authenticated communication between Alice and Bob enables a measure of the
information an eavesdropper potentially possesses, and hence, its reduction. Seen in this light,
QKD is essentially a key expansion scheme, that is, a short initial authentication key is sufficient
to continuously generate new information-theoretically secure keys [6]. Most importantly, the
secret keys generated by QKD are universally composable, which allows one to partially reuse
them for authenticating the distillation processes of subsequent QKD rounds. Remaining bits are
then available for message encryption and authentication. QKD may also be used to enhance
security of cryptography schemes based on computational complexity, e.g. advanced encryption
standard (AES) can benefit from regularly refreshed encryption keys.
Since the mid 1990s, QKD has progressed rapidly in several aspects. Starting from the
early demonstration of feasibility experiments [7, 8], faster and faster (with bit rates on the
order of Mbps [9, 10]) and long reaching systems (up to 250 km [11, 12]) have been developed.
With the aim of reducing the number of required fibre links between two QKD systems, dense-
wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) of quantum and classical channels over one single
fibre has been investigated, e.g. in [13–16]. However, most of the early experiments focused
only on the physical layer: photon generation, manipulation, transmission and detection. Even
up to today, systems which include all necessary components for secure and fast QKD are
rare. Indeed, those components are numerous and need multidisciplinary competence (see
figure 4). Important and often forgotten parts include random number generation, real-time
error correction and privacy amplification, secure authentication and finite-key security analysis.
Recently, the need for faster systems has stimulated the development of dedicated hardware
engines for quantum key distillation, e.g. [17–19].
In this paper, we present the results of a project (www.nano-tera.ch/nanoterawiki/qcrypt)
whose ambition was to implement a complete and practical fibre based QKD prototype in
collaboration between six research teams in Switzerland. In particular we put emphasis on
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of our optical implementation for the COW QKD
protocol and the key distillation procedures implemented in the fast FPGA hardware.
continuous operation with a wavelength multiplexed service channel for synchronization and
distillation, efficient hardware real-time distillation, finite-key security analysis and frugal
authentication. In section 2, we present the heart of any QKD prototype, the field programmable
gate array (FPGA) based engine controlling all the hardware as well as the complete key
distillation and authentication process. This QKD engine can be adapted to many QKD
protocols. In section 4, we briefly present the employed ‘coherent one-way’ (COW) protocol
and its specific opto-electronic realization. Section 4 presents the experimental results and a
discussion.
2. Quantum key distribution (QKD) engine
The QKD system described in the following was designed to have the flexibility to
adapt to different QKD implementations and protocols. A schematic representation of our
implementation is shown in figure 1. It is built around FPGAs (Xilinx Virtex 6), which manage
the fast interfaces for the optical components, the classical communication channels, all the
sub-protocols that accompany QKD as well as the distribution of the generated secret keys.
The choice of various parameters as well as all the algorithms used for key distillation and
authentication processes have been carefully chosen by taking into account various trade-offs
between engineering and cost constraints. Importantly, we have taken special care to analyse
and optimize all tasks with respect to reducing the requirements and resources such that only
one single FPGA is needed in each device. In general, compromises had to be found between the
post-processing key size (>105 bits), as required in finite-key scenarios analysed in appendix,
and limits imposed by the hardware in terms of memory size and throughput. A personal
computer (PC) is connected to each FPGA via PCI Express to access the configuration, status
and monitoring registers. The final secret key can be transferred from the key manager to this
PC and further distributed to external applications. Two communication links are established,
a one-way quantum channel and a bidirectional classical service channel. All channels can be
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wavelength-multiplexed on a single fibre using DWDM. In the following, we describe in more
detail the functionality of each module of our QKD engine. For a more complete (and technical)
description of the code architecture and the used algorithms, please refer to [20].
2.1. Quantum channel interface module
Two digital 1.25 Gbps full-duplex serial interfaces at each FPGA (for Alice and Bob) allow
synchronized interconnection with the optical hardware of the quantum channel. At Alice, they
output up to two parallel streams of digital on-off pulses with adjustable amplitude and width,
which are used to drive an electro-optical modulator for quantum state preparation. For the
implementation of the COW protocol as presented later, the output of one interface is needed to
drive an intensity modulator. Using the output of the second interface as well, one can control a
dual-drive modulator and prepare all quantum states required by BB84 or the differential phase-
shift (DPS) protocol, as we have shown in [21]. At Bob’s device, both digital full-duplex serial
interfaces are used, each connected to one single photon detector (SPD), SPDD and SPDM,
respectively. They provide the detector gate trigger if needed, and receive the detection signals
from the corresponding SPD. Digital delays with 10 ps resolution allow temporal alignment of
the detector gates with respect to the quantum signals, and temporal alignment of the detection
signals with respect to Bob’s FPGA clock.
2.2. Service channel interface module
Two optical 2.5 Gbps small form-factor pluggable (SFP) transceivers (Finisar) on each side
establish a bidirectional (full-duplex) classical communication link between Alice and Bob. All
tasks which are needed to continuously generate secret keys or to further use these keys, share
this link employing time-division multiplexing. These tasks requiring classical communication
comprise, in particular, synchronization, alignment, sifting, parameter estimation, error
correction and verification, privacy amplification, authentication, key management, encryption,
administration and logging. Some of them strictly require authentication, some of them
encryption or even both as discussed later. The priority of each task, as well as the allocated
communication bandwidth, can be adjusted individually. We employ DWDM to transmit all
classical communication channels together with the quantum channel simultaneously over a
single fibre. The FPGA system clock of Bob is synchronized and phase stabilized with 10 ps
precision with the master clock of Alice. All other necessary frequencies are derived from this
clock, most importantly Alice’s quantum state modulation frequency and Bob’s detector gate
frequency.
2.3. Sifting and sampling module
This module realizes sifting of incompatible detections and optionally parameter estimation.
Sifting essentially comprises three steps. Firstly, since a large fraction of photons is lost in
the fibre link or is not detected, Bob discloses which of the qubits he detected, without
revealing the detected bit value. Secondly, Bob announces for each detection his randomly
chosen measurement basis. Finally, Alice responds for each detection whether or not to discard
it due to incompatible preparation and measurement basis. The first two sifting steps have to
be performed as fast as possible in order to allow Alice to sift out undetected and incompatible
4
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Figure 2. Number of bits per detection which have to be sent from Bob to Alice for
detection times and base sifting. Blue corresponds to short sifting blocks optimized
for detection probabilities >0.021, red uses longer sifting blocks optimized for lower
detection probabilities. For comparison, the minimum amount given by the Shannon
limit is shown in yellow (dashed).
bits from her memory before exceeding the available buffer size. In each sifting block, Bob
encodes the detection time index of a detection relative to the index of the previous detection.
Additionally, he attaches to each sifting block two control bits, which are used to indicate either
the measurement basis for each detection, or empty blocks when no detection occurred during
the maximum time that can be encoded in a single sifting block.
The number of bits exchanged during sifting has to be kept as small as possible, since
this communication has to be authenticated at the cost of secret bits. The longer the fibre,
the more bits are needed to indicate the time (number of clock cycles) passed between two
succeeding detections. We switch to 14 bits instead of 6, for detection probabilities smaller than
2× 10−2 per gate. As shown in figure 2, our way to encode the time information is very efficient
(less than twice the Shannon limit) for detection probabilities between 10−1–10−4 per gate.
Some QKD protocols, e.g. COW, use only one basis to obtain the raw key. All detection
outcomes in the second basis are publicly revealed in order to estimate the phase error of the
received quantum states. Bob reveals these measurement outcomes in the two control bits, too. If
parameter estimation based on randomly revealing a fraction of detection outcomes is required
for the quantum bit error rate (QBER) in the raw key, optionally a third control bit can be sent
per detection. However, for the results we present here, we omit such sampling in favour of a
more efficient solution as described below.
If double detections occur in both detectors at the same time, we only keep the result from
one detector, e.g. for COW the data detector SPDD. If double detections occur in both time-bins
of the same qubit, we assign a randomly chosen value. A logical deadtime between 8 ns and
10 µs can be applied after detection, during which all detections are discarded to reduce errors
due to detector afterpulsing.
2.4. Error correction and verification module
Due to practical limitations in the preparation of the quantum states, and due to detector
noise and jitter, Bob’s sifted key differs from Alice’s original key even in the absence of
eavesdropping. Therefore, a forward error correction (FEC) code is implemented in the FPGA
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Figure 3. (left) Measurement results for different code rates showing the probability
that the comparison between Alice and Bob’s verification hash tags indicates at least
one remaining error per 2048 bit block of error corrected keys. (right) Effective QBER
under the conservative assumption that during each block with verification hash failure
the eavesdropping attacks induced an error rate of 1/2.
as described in [22], which uses the quasi-cyclic low-density parity-check (LDPC) code defined
in [23]. Error correction based on LDPC codes uses syndrome encoding with the advantage
that only non-iterative one-way communication is required. Moreover, its efficiency in terms of
revealed information can in principle approach the Shannon limit. Our FPGA implementation
for LDPC performs FEC on blocks of 1944 bit length and provides rates up to 235 Mbps at
62.5 MHz clock frequency with ten decoding iterations. The LDPC code rate, i.e. the fraction of
unpublished information, can be set to fEC (Q) ∈ {1/2, 2/3, 3/4, 5/6} to adapt to the expected
error rates. Bob calculates all syndromes for a constant expected error rate, and forwards them
to Alice through an authenticated channel. Alice performs syndrome decoding and checks the
parity. If an error occurred, the corresponding block is discarded. However, there is still a
certain probability that uncorrected errors remain after error correction, especially for error
rates larger than 6% (see figure 3, left). To detect remaining errors, we implement a subsequent
verification step, where Bob transmits a 48-bit hash checksum per LDPC code block to Alice.
The checksums are generated using polynomial hashing [3, 4], with a new random 48-bit
seed for each checksum. The universal hash function is randomly chosen, and the collision
probability on at least one of 512 subsequent blocks (corresponding to 995 328 bit input length
for privacy amplification) is upper-bounded by εVER 6 7.7× 10−11. For each block, the hash, as
well as the random choice of hash function, is sent to Alice. If a checksum mismatch occurs,
the associated block is discarded. Figure 3 (left) shows for all implemented code rates the
probability that a verification fails as a function of the measured raw QBER.
2.5. Bit error estimation module
In every QKD protocol the number of errors of the received quantum states has to be estimated
in order to determine an upper bound on the fraction of information which could have leaked
to an eavesdropper. The standard procedure consists in random sampling of a subset of the
sifted key, comparing the bit values over an authenticated channel and calculating the error
rate in each basis. While straightforward, this method reduces the final secret key rate as
all revealed outcomes have to be discarded. Most importantly, it has a substantial impact on
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finite-key analysis, since a small sample gives only an imprecise estimate of the true error rate
in the remaining, unrevealed detections.
To overcome these impairments, we perform parameter estimation exploiting our
knowledge about the correctness of the key after verification. Once we obtain 512 blocks
of 1944 error corrected and verified bits, Alice compares them with her original random bit
sequence [24]. By counting the total number of mismatches, an exact number for the true
bit errors is obtained. Additionally, we take into account blocks which were dropped due to
checksum mismatches during error verification. We conservatively assume for each block with
verification hash failure a maximum error rate of 1/2 induced by eavesdropping attacks. In
figure 3 (right) we show the resulting, effective QBER for different code rates as a function of
the measured QBER. The failure probability for parameter estimation is then equal to the failure
probability of error verification, i.e. εPE 6 7.7× 10−11.
2.6. Privacy amplification module
Our FPGA implementation of privacy amplification uses Toeplitz hashing [3, 4], a construction
for families of universal hash functions, in combination with linear-feedback shift register
(LFSR) based hashing as proposed in [25, 26]. This approach is very efficient in terms of
communication bandwidth needed to convey the chosen hash function, and allows parallelized
computation and efficient, scalable implementation on the FPGA hardware.
The privacy amplification compression is the ratio between the length of the output and
input keys, i.e. the ratio between the number of rows and columns of the Toeplitz matrix. In
order to obtain high secret key rates based on finite-key analysis, we choose a fixed input length
of 995 328 bits. As a consequence of this large block size, the size of the resulting matrix is such
that it has to be stored in an external memory outside the FPGA. Our hardware implementation
for privacy amplification has been shown to treat up to 48 Mbps input rate. Changing the output
block length, the compression ratio can be adjusted over the full range between 0–100% in steps
of 0.05%. We optimize and fix the compression ratio once in advance for a given scenario. Then,
we verify for each key that the parameter estimates are indeed within the limits which guarantee
security with the chosen compression ratio.
2.7. Authentication module
The classical communication channel is authenticated in order to prevent an eavesdropper from
forging messages, which would open the door for man-in-the-middle attacks. For information-
theoretically secure authentication, we use a combination [27] of εAUT-almost strongly universal
hash functions in combination with a strongly universal family of hash functions named
polynomial hashing [3, 4], which is very efficient with respect to consumed secret bits as well
as required operations. Bob randomly and secretly selects a hash function from this family to
calculate a hash tag for each transmitted message, and sends the hash tags together with the
messages to Alice. To verify that the transmission has not been forged, Alice has to know which
hash functions Bob has chosen to be able to verify the hash tags for the received messages. Only
when her calculated and the received tag for a message match, is it considered valid. We send a
new 127-bit authentication tag for every 220 bits of classical communication to obtain a collision
probability of εAUT 6 10−33. This approach would require 383 secret bits to select a new hash
function for every tag. However, recently it has been shown that the same hash function can be
reused for multiple authentication rounds if the tags attached to the messages [28] are one-time
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pad encrypted. This authentication scheme is proven ε-universal-composable-secure if ε-almost
strongly universal2 hash functions are used and provides a bound for its information leakage.
This strategy reduces the secret key consumption to one third, since only 127 bit secret keys are
needed to encrypt each tag instead of 383 secret bits to select a new hash function.
2.8. Random number generation module
Random numbers are extensively needed during preparation for selecting the quantum states,
as well as during key distillation, e.g. to generate the privacy amplification matrices. These
random bits must be provided by true quantum random number generators (QRNGs), ideally
QRNGs where up to 2 GHz output rates have been demonstrated [29] to date. However
for the time being, we use a commercial QRNG (www.idquantique.com/random-number-
generators/products.html) (certified by Swiss Federal Office of Metrology). Since its bit rate of
4 Mbps is by far not sufficient, we implement the NIST SP800-90 recommended AES (counter
mode) cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator that uses seeds of 256 bits
provided by the QRNG to generate up to 1.1 Gbps random bits. We note that, due to AES, the
random number expansion protocol is the only key distillation step for which we cannot provide
an information-theoretic security statement.
2.9. Key manager
A fraction of the privacy amplified, secret keys is transferred by the key manager to the
authentication module. Once their authenticity has been verified, the key manager distributes
the remaining keys to an internal one-time pad encryption application, or via a PCI Express link
to a PC and further to external consumers, e.g. network encryptors.
3. Coherent one-way protocol and implementation
The presented QKD system provides the flexibility to drive different QKD protocols [21]. In the
following, we present the implementation of the COW protocol [30].
The COW protocol belongs to the class of distributed phase reference protocols and seeks
to enable long fibre distance QKD while maintaining a simple and convenient setup. The
advantages of the COW protocol are that it allows implementation of a completely passive
receiver, without any active element for the choice of basis, requiring only two SPDs. Its
implementation is robust against birefringence fluctuations, fibre transmission losses and photon
number splitting attacks. A schematic of the setup is sketched in figure 1.
Following the COW protocol, Alice encodes each bit value by the choice of sending a
weak coherent pulse in one out of two possible time-bins, while the other time-bin contains
the vacuum state. Formally, these quantum states can be written as |β0〉n = |α〉2n |vac〉2n−1
and |β1〉n = |vac〉2n |α〉2n−1, where α is the complex coherent state amplitude with an average
photon number per time bin µ= |α|2 < 1, and n labels the qubit index. These states can be
discriminated optimally by a simple time-of-arrival measurement. In addition, a third state
called decoy sequence with both time-bins containing weak coherent pulses is randomly
prepared, i.e. |βd〉n = |α〉2n |α〉2n−1.
As for distributed-phase-reference QKD, the integrity of the quantum channel is monitored
using an unbalanced interferometer (IF). It measures the coherence between pulses in two
successive, non-empty time-bins, either within a bit when a decoy sequence was prepared, or
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across bit separation whenever corresponding sequences are prepared. The latter measurement
across bit separation renders photon number splitting attacks on individual states less powerful
as the adversary reduces the interference visibility if trying to discriminate individual states. As
a consequence, the optimal average number of photons which can be sent per qubit becomes
independent of the fibre transmission, but dependent on QBER and visibility. Security against
zero error attacks and restricted collective attacks was proven, including imperfections of the
state preparation [31]. Note that a general security proof was obtained for a modified COW
protocol [32], which, however, involves more intricate hardware.
3.1. Alice’s optical QKD module
The coherent light source is a continuous-wave distributed feedback laser diode (Agilecom)
with a sufficiently long coherence time of >300 ns. It is compatible with the 100 GHz DWDM
telecom standard, and its central wavelength regulated by a thermo-electric controller to λ=
1551.72 nm (ITU channel 32)8.
An integrated LiNbO3 intensity modulator (IM, Photline MX-LN 20) prepares the COW
states. It tailors the continuous optical signal in a coherent train of short pulses, according to
the states selected by the random number generator. The corresponding digital on–off signals
are provided through the high-speed serial interfaces of the FPGA, reshaped to clean pulses
of 50–400 ps duration and amplified to appropriate voltage levels for the IM input. The bias
voltage is adjusted to maximize the optical pulse extinction ratio. Indeed, the extinction ratio
of the IM limits the minimum QBER since spurious light in a supposedly empty time bin
causes erroneous detections. Therefore, we use the QBER as feedback to re-adjust the IM
bias voltage continuously. More than 25 dB extinction is achieved for 130 ps long pulses at a
frequency of 625 MHz, limiting the expected QBER to 0.3%. Decoy sequences are prepared
with a probability of 15.5%, close to the optimum, which allows for a sifted key rate as high as
73% of the raw key rate.
A micromirror based variable optical attenuator (Sercalo) attenuates the quantum signal
down to the optimal photon level at Alice’s output. Its value is optimized with respect to the
QBER, visibility and other parameters as discussed later. The optical isolator prevents Trojan
horse attacks (based on sending bright light from the outside). A 90:10 imbalanced fibre coupler
and tap monitor diode allow continuous monitoring of Alice’s output power and providing
feedback to the variable optical attenuator to adjust the average number of photons per bit.
Moreover, an unexpected increase of power in the monitor diode would indicate malfunction
or a Trojan horse attack. Finally, a fixed, calibrated optical attenuator just before Alice’s output
reduces the average photon number per pulse to the optimal value.
3.2. Bob’s optical QKD module
At Bob’s quantum channel input, an optical isolator prevents information leakage due to detector
backfiring or back-reflection of potential Trojan horse attacks. A 45 pm spectral fibre Bragg
grating (aos) filter with 1.4 dB insertion loss and 14 dB isolation reduces incoming Raman noise.
Subsequently, a fibre coupler CB realizes the passive, random base choice and splits the quantum
signals towards data and monitoring line. Its splitting ratio of 80:20 is close to optimal for the
experimental settings used in the following.
8 2013 ITU-T Recommendation G.694.1 Spectral grids for WDM applications: DWDM frequency grid, 02.
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Two SPDs are installed: SPDD measures the photon arrival time in the data line to obtain
the raw key, SPDM detects the output of the unbalanced IF in the monitoring line. For the
results presented in section 4, SPDD is a sine gated InGaAs avalanche photo diode (APD)
with a frequency of 1.25 GHz as described in [33]. Its gate width (full-width at half-maximum
(FWHM)) is 130 ps, which proves to be a good trade-off between sufficiently low afterpulsing
while maintaining good detection efficiency. The efficiency is varied in the range 6–10%,
maximizing the final secret key rate. For the considered fibre distances, the dark counts are not
the limiting factor and the highest key rate was indeed obtained at room temperature (20 ◦C). At
this temperature, the dark count probability is about 10−6 per gate at 10% efficiency.
As the monitoring detection rate is much smaller, SPDM is a free-running negative feedback
InGaAs APD [34]. Applying 20µs deadtime, its dark count rate was typically 800 Hz at 20%
detection efficiency. Importantly, its timing jitter is only 200 ps (FWHM), sufficiently low to
discriminate time-bins at 1.25 GHz. The gate times for both detectors are derived from the
clock signal distributed over the service channel, and are digitally delayed to compensate for
any temporal delay between quantum and service channels.
The Michelson type IF as sketched in figure 1 is made up of a fibre coupler with two
Faraday mirrors terminating the two arms. The arms are cut such that the length difference
corresponds to half the separation between consecutive time bins. The measured free-spectral
range of 1.247 GHz matches very well the target frequency of 1.25 GHz. The IF has 1.3 dB
insertion loss and a maximum visibility >0.998. It is thermally well isolated and actively
temperature stabilized. The relative phase, however, is adjusted by tuning Alice’s laser
wavelength such that two succeeding pulses interfere destructively and do not generate detector
clicks. In contrast, non-interfering pulse sequences are distributed randomly between the two
output ports of the IF. Using detections due to both interfering and non-interfering sequences,
we compute the visibility as described at the end of appendix. Note that the second output port
could be monitored via an additional circulator at the cost of increased insertion loss and the
need of a third detector. This would slightly increase the secret key fraction, as Eve’s information
could be estimated more precisely.
3.3. Mechanical housing and DWDM modules
Each QKD device is integrated in a 19 inch 2U housing as shown in figure 4. It provides a
power input, a single mode fibre connector (APC) for the quantum channel, a PCI-Express link
to the control PC and two SFP slots for the service channel and an optional external encryptor.
Importantly, despite these connectors the mechanical housing is perfectly encapsulated from
the environment to prevent any physical attack point other than through the optical fibre. In
particular, the arrangement of all components has been carefully chosen to maintain efficient
heat release and to guarantee maximum stability, while the cooling air only flows around the
outside of the devices without entering.
During all key exchanges presented here, we used one single optical fibre and DWDM
of quantum and all classical channels. We implemented external DWDM modules for Alice
and Bob in separate 19-inch 1U cases, comprising a 100 GHz multiplexer (OptiWorks) and
a variable optical attenuator (OptoLink) to minimize the power of the transmitted classical
channels. The multiplexers have an isolation of 80 dB and an insertion loss of 1.8 dB.
10
New J. Phys. 16 (2014) 013047 N Walenta et al
Figure 4. Photo of the opened QKD devices. Each system is compatible with 19-inch 2U
industrial cases and houses all the electronics, optics and interfaces to distribute quantum
keys, using the QKD keys for Ethernet authentication and one-time pad encryption,
and to additionally supply them to external consumer devices. In consideration of
security aspects, their interior is completely mechanically encapsulated, while thermal
stabilization is provided by two external fans. Using external 19 inch 1U DWDM
modules (bottom), both devices were connected by only one single telecom fibre
and have demonstrated stable QKD functionality with a security guarantee of εQKD =
4× 10−9 over more than 25 km distance.
3.4. Practical security considerations
While security proofs for QKD assume ideal, well implemented devices, practical hacking
against imperfections of experimental systems has been demonstrated. We designed our system
considering known attacks: Alice’s device is protected against Trojan horse attacks by an
optical isolator in combination with the attenuators and tap monitor as shown in figure 1. At
Bob’s device, the isolator and spectral filter protect against information leakage due to reflected
photons or detector backfiring. Attacks which exploit detector efficiency mismatches [35], e.g.
time-shift attacks, can be ruled out since only one detector is used to discriminate the bit values.
Similarly, information leakage due to optical side channels of the source is prevented by using
only one laser and the same modulator to prepare all quantum states.
Another powerful attack is the so-called detector blinding attack [36, 37]. However, due
to the large imbalance of Bob’s fibre coupler for passive random base choice (CB in figure 1)
this attack is unlikely to work if two similar photo diodes are used [38]. Moreover, this attack
would significantly increase the photo current [39], which we continuously monitor for both
detectors independently. In order to prevent attacks exploiting the dead time of the monitor
detector, a conservative approach is to disregard detections in the data detector during this
time. However, this is not necessary if the eavesdropper does not know when the monitor
detector clicks. This is the case if the detections are announced only after a certain delay, and
the detector is not saturated. Extensive testing of the practical security is the subject of future
work.
4. Experimental results
We tested the system over fibre lengths between 1–50 km using rapid sine gated SPDs [33] as
well as free-running SPDs (id220, IDQ). All classical and quantum communication channels
11
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Figure 5. (left) Secret key rates after privacy amplification (blue circles) and
authenticated secret key rate (purple triangles) which accounts for secret key
consumption for authenticating the classical communication channel. We considered
a security analysis that respects finite-key-size effects, authentication costs and system
errors with a security parameter of εQKD = 4× 10−9. (right) QBER and raw visibility
results before removing dark counts.
were multiplexed onto a common fibre. Using different configurations of the distillation engine
we optimized the key rates for a security parameter of 4× 10−9, while respecting a security
analysis for finite-key-size effects, authentication costs and system errors.
For the measurements which we discuss in the following, we obtained the highest secret
key rate using an LDPC error correction code rate of 3/4, parameter estimation based on key
comparison and longer sifting blocks to encode the detection times in 14 bits. The secret key
rate, which is provided by the FPGA distillation engine after privacy amplification, is shown
in figure 5 (left, circle). Multiplexing quantum and classical channels over a single 1 km fibre,
secret keys were distributed at a rate of 144.5 kbps. Over a single 25 km long fibre, after privacy
amplification, we obtained a secret key rate of 22.5 kbps. The useful rate of secret bits available
for applications, e.g. internal one-time-pad encryption or external encryptors is shown as red
triangles in figure 5 and accounts for secret bit consumption to encode the authentication tags.
4.1. Parameter optimization
For each setting we optimized several parameters to maximize the final authenticated secret
key rate. These are summarized in table 1. For longer fibres, the average photon number was
increased and the detection efficiency decreased in order to compensate for increasing DWDM
noise (Raman scattering and crosstalk) and dark counts. As such, the QBER was maintained
close to the maximum QBER, which could be efficiently corrected with the chosen LDPC code
rate (see figure 3). For the different fibre lengths we obtained a QBER (before subtracting dark
counts) as shown in figure 5 (right). The QBER increases for longer fibres and is considerably
larger than the error rate, which we estimated using sub-sampling instead. This additional
contribution stems from blocks of error corrected bits, which have not passed the subsequent
hash tag verification. For these blocks we conservatively attribute a priori an error rate of 1/2
to the eavesdropper. Thus, with a verification failure probability of 3.1% for a 25 km fibre, the
QBER that we take into account increases above 3.4%. Nevertheless, we verified that in the
presented configurations the final secret key rate was still higher compared to configurations
12
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Table 1. Parameters and measurement results summarizing the performance of the QKD
prototype for information theoretic secure key distribution with a security parameter of
4× 10−9.
Fibre length (km) 1 km 12.5 km 25 km
Pulse amplitude µ 0.089 0.084 0.105
Detection efficiency (%) 9.6 7.3 6.9
Compression factor (%) 11.5 12.0 6.5
LDPC code rate 3/4 3/4 3/4
QBER (%) (raw/verified) 1.70± 0.01/1.98 1.87± 0.02/3.03 1.91± 0.03/3.42
Dark count contribution 0.41 0.76 0.85
DWDM noise contribution 0.05 0.11 0.19
Raw visibility (%) 98.14± 0.14 98.06± 0.13 97.81± 0.13
Sifted key rate (bps) (1.26± 0.006)× 106 (5.38± 0.032)× 105 (3.59± 0.042)× 105
Secret key rate (bps) 1.45× 105 6.29× 104 2.25× 104
Authenticated key rate (bps) 1.41× 105 6.12× 104 2.14× 104
with parameter estimation based on sub-sampling, since the impairment due to verification
failures is overcompensated by the advantage that no bits have to be revealed and discarded.
Similarly, we found that smaller error correction code rates did not result in higher key rates.
The raw visibility (before subtracting dark counts) in figure 5 (right, red) remains almost
constant for all fibre lengths. It drops slightly, below 97%, for long fibres due to increasing
DWDM noise and dark count detections. Mainly determined by the visibility and photon
number, and with slight dependence on the QBER, we applied privacy amplification with a
compression factor of 11.5% for a fibre of 1 km length, which dropped to 6.5% for 25 km.
4.2. Stability
In figure 6 we show the stability in terms of key rates, QBER and visibility for an autonomous
QKD run over a period of more than 11 hours using a single 12.5 km DWDM fibre link. The
results clearly reflect the good stability of all system components including synchronization
and alignment, Alice’s state preparation, Bob’s IF and SPDs, and the whole distillation engine.
The average raw QBER as measured by comparing Alice’s error corrected key with her
original key was 1.91% over the whole measurement period (figure 6, right). The raw visibility
before subtracting dark counts had an average of 98.1%, and was constantly above 97.0%.
Considering finite-key security with QKD = 4× 10−9, we applied a compression factor of 0.12,
and accounting for the fraction of blocks which were discarded due to verification failures, the
resulting secret key rate was 62.9 kbps.
During two live presentations at conferences9, we have demonstrated the robustness,
stability and reliability of our QKD system. Over periods of 2 and 5 days, the system ran
continuously and provided, at a rate of more than 30 times per second, new secret 128 bit keys
to network encryptors, which used the keys for AES encryption of user data and video streams.
9 Nano-Tera 2013, Annual Plenary Meeting (30–31 May 2013, Bern, Switzerland) and QCrypt 2013, 3rd
International Conference on Quantum Cryptography (5–9 August 2013, Waterloo, Canada).
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Figure 6. Key rates (left), QBER and visibility (right) demonstrating the stability of an
autonomous QKD run for a period of more than 11 hours. Alice’s and Bob’s devices
were connected by a single 12.5 km fibre. The secret key rate (left, red) accounts for
finite-key effects, the authenticated key rate (left, purple) for the consumption of secret
keys to encrypt the authentication tags.
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Figure 7. Amount of classical information accompanying QKD. (left) Total
communication rates per secret bit and fraction of secret bits remaining after
authenticating the classical communication channels. At least 2.7% of secret bits are
consumed for authentication, i.e. to encrypt the authentication tags of 127 bits per
106 bits of classical communication. (right) Communication rates broken down by
individual sub-protocols for the considered fibre lengths. The rates are dominated by
the amount of sifting information sent from Bob to Alice, which adds up to 94–99%,
depending on the specific configuration.
4.3. Authentication costs
The secret key rates usually presented are the key rates after privacy amplification, i.e. they do
not account for secret bit consumption to encode the authentication tags. Therefore, figure 7
shows the amount of classical communication accompanying key distillation as well as the
fraction of secret bits which are consumed to encrypt authentication tags of 127 bit per 106 bits
of classical communication. The left side of figure 7 shows the amount of classical information
which has to be communicated normalized per secret bit, as well as in terms of authenticated
fraction of secret bits left after authentication. It reveals that, for all considered fibre lengths,
the least fraction of secret bits consumed for authentication is obtained if we use long sifting
blocks and parameter estimation based on key comparison (circles). For a fibre of 1 km length,
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Figure 8. Projected compression factors as a function of the security parameter εQKD
for fibre lengths of 1 km (blue), 12.5 km (red) and 25 km (green). All other parameters
are taken from table 1.
217 classical bits have to be communicated per secret bit. Correspondingly, a fraction of
2.7% of secret bits is needed for authenticating this communication, i.e. the authenticated
key rate amounts to 97.3%. It increases up to 412 bits of classical communication per secret
bit for a 25 km fibre, where 5.0% of secret bits are needed for authentication, corresponding
to an authenticated key rate of 95.0%. Much more classical information has to be sent and
authenticated, if short sifting blocks with only 6 bits instead of 14 bits are used to encode the
detection times, and nearly 20% of all secret bits are consumed for authentication (triangles in
figure 7).
The origin of the different authentication losses is illustrated in figure 7 (right), where
we compare the communication rates broken down by each individual sub-protocol. With
more than 94% the largest amount of information is sent for sifting. More than one order
of magnitude less, up to 4.5%, for communicating the randomly chosen Toeplitz matrices
for privacy amplification. At most 1.2% of all classical communication is attributed to error
correction including communication of the verification hash function and value, and less than
0.1% for authentication. Using shorter sifting blocks (triangles in figure 7), the relative amount
of sifting information becomes even larger, giving rise to larger authentication loss. However,
we expect that the shorter blocks used to encode the detection times become advantageous
as soon as higher detection rates are obtained. This would be the case when detectors with
higher detection efficiency are used, e.g. superconducting SPDs, or two fibre links instead of
one, which would eliminate optical losses in multiplexers and spectral filters. When we used
parameter estimation based on sub-sampling instead of key comparison, the amount of classical
communication was 12.6% larger for all fibre lengths, corresponding to the fraction of bits
which were revealed and discarded.
5. Conclusions and outlook
To conclude, we have presented a fully integrated versatile QKD platform that comprises a
hardware key distillation engine, DWDM of quantum and all classical communication channels,
and fast sine gating detectors. We demonstrated its stable performance for the COW protocol,
and rigorously took into account all aspects which guarantee security in finite key scenarios with
a security parameter of 4× 10−9. Our QKD platform has the flexibility to not only support the
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COW protocol, but additionally provides all the means to run the DPS QKD protocol, as well
as phase-time qubit BB84. The system is compactly mounted in standard industrial 19 inch 2U
housings.
The particular choice of the security parameter value εQKD can to some extent be adapted
to specific user requirements. In our current implementation the total security parameter is
mainly limited to 7× 10−11 by the failure probability of the error verification process. A simple
increase of the error verification hash tag size from 48 bit to 72 bit would reduce this limit
to approximately 10−20. The security parameter can be improved by only reducing the privacy
amplification compression factor, however, at the cost of the secret key rate. In figure 8 we show
the projected compression factors as a function of εQKD, using the same parameters and results
of table 1. It can be seen that an adaptation of the compression factor to a security parameter of
εQKD = 10−20 would reduce the secret key rate to 50–70%, depending on the fibre length.
All results were obtained using a one-fibre DWDM configuration with all quantum and
classical communication channels multiplexed in one common fibre and taking into account
finite key security for a block size of 106 bits. However, we want to stress that depending on
the specific usage scenario and security requirements, the maximum secret key rate as well
as the maximum fibre length can easily be increased. As an example, we performed the same
set of measurements while neglecting finite-key effects, and obtained after authentication an
asymptotic key rate of 293 kbps and 1.3 kbps for fibre lengths of 1 and 50 km, respectively. A
further increase by more than a factor of two in both key rate and distance can be expected if
instead of multiplexing all channels over one single fibre, two fibres are available, one dark fibre
for the quantum channel and a second fibre for the classical communication channels.
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Appendix. COW finite-key rates
We consider a COW transmitter at Alice as depicted in figure 1 which prepares time-bin qubits
with a frequency fQ. In general, the prepared quantum state after a time tN =N/ fQ can be
written in the form of a product state
|9〉N =⊗Nn=1 |ψ (bn, vn)〉n (A.1)
|ψ (bn, vn)〉n =⊗nbit−1i=0 |α (bn, vn, i)〉n·nbit−i (A.2)
of coherent quantum states |α〉τ . Their complex amplitudes α in temporal mode τ depend on
Alice’s random choice of basis bn ∈ {0, 1} and bit value vn ∈ {0, 1}. We have introduced a
parameter nbit = fgate/ fQ that accounts for the implementations where nbit successive temporal
modes are used to distinguish the states. It is nbit = 2 for COW and BB84 phase-time
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qubits, while for DPS nbit = 1. Whenever Alice chooses bn = 0, she prepares a quantum state
corresponding to a bit value
|ψ (0, 0)〉n =
∣∣∣∣√ µ(1 + ηIM)
〉
2n
⊗
∣∣∣∣√ ηIM ·µ(1 + ηIM)
〉
2n−1
,
|ψ (0, 1)〉n =
∣∣∣∣√ ηIM ·µ(1 + ηIM)
〉
2n
⊗
∣∣∣∣√ µ(1 + ηIM)
〉
2n−1
. (A.3)
Here, µ= |α2| is the mean value of the Poissonian distributed number of photons per coherent
state, and 06 ηIM 6 1 accounts for a limited extinction ratio of the intensity modulator. In the
ideal case it is ηIM = 0 and equation (A.3) becomes |√µ〉⊗ |0〉 and |0〉⊗ |√µ〉. Whenever
Alice chooses bn = 1 with probability pDecoy a decoy sequence, irrespective of the bit value she
prepares
|ψ(1, 0)〉n = |ψ (1, 1)〉n = |
√
µ〉2n ⊗ |√µ〉2n−1. (A.4)
The goal of Alice and Bob is to maximize the COW secret key rate (per prepared state)
rsec, which can be distilled from the transmitted and detected states
rsec = rdet ·βsift ·βest · fsec ·βauth (A.5)
= rsift · (1− ηPE) · fsec · (1− ηMAC) , (A.6)
where rdet is the detection rate (per prepared bit) in Bob’s detector SPDD. Further, βsift, βest, fsec
and βaut signify the key size reductions during sifting, parameter estimation, privacy
amplification and authentication, respectively. In the considered COW implementation, a
fraction βsift =
(
1− pDecoy
)
/
(
1 + pDecoy
)
of all detections in SPDD is discarded during sifting.
Furthermore, βest = 0.875 if we perform parameter estimation based on sub-sampling, and
βest = 1 if we estimate the QBER by key comparison.
Including finite-key-size effects, the secret key fraction fsec under the assumption of a
restricted collective attack [31] is given for a QBER Q by the Devetak–Winter bound
fsec = 1− leakEC − leakVER(Q + δQ)− (1− Q − δQ) · h
[
1 +1
2
]
−βsmooth −βEC −βPA. (A.7)
The leakage of the error correction scheme leakEC is in the ideal case the binary entropy
h [Q], while in the implementation at present, leakEC = 1− fEC, with the chosen LDPC code
rate fEC ∈ {5/6, 3/4, 2/3, 1/2}. The leakage from the verification step after error correction
amounts to leakVER = l/b = 0.023 with l = 48 bits the length of each verification hash tag and
b = 2048 bits the block length per verification. The overlap 1= |〈ψ1|ψ0〉| between the two bit
states is for an observed visibility V
1= (2 (V − δV )− 1) e−µ− 2
√
1− e−2µ
√
(V − δV ) · (1− (V − δV )). (A.8)
Due to the finite post-processing size we include statistical fluctuations of expected QBER and
visibility values, given by analysis based on interval estimation. For parameter estimation based
on sub-sampling, it is [40, 41]
δQ =
√
1 + ηPE (nPP − 1)
(ηPE nPP)
2 log
[
1
PE
]
(A.9)
17
New J. Phys. 16 (2014) 013047 N Walenta et al
In contrast, for parameter estimation based on key comparison, no uncertainty from
statistical fluctuations impairs the QBER, i.e.
δQ = 0. (A.10)
However, in both cases the deducible visibility is limited by an uncertainty δV due to the
finite-key-size as
δV =
√
1
2
(
log
[
1
VPE
]
+ 2 log [nV + 1]
)
/nV . (A.11)
nV is the number of useful detections in the monitor detector from which the visibility is
calculated. In the trusted detector scenario the secret key rate is optimized using QBER and
visibility values that are corrected for detector errors, which cannot be exploited or manipulated
by an eavesdropper, e.g. dark counts. For the leakage term in equation (A.7), the uncorrected
QBER value must be considered.
Furthermore, we account in equation (A.7) for the reduction βsmooth due to uncertainty
induced by smoothing the min-entropy, and the failure probabilities βEC and βPA of the error
correction and privacy amplification protocols [41]
βsmooth = 7
√
log2
[
2
εSmooth
]
/nPP, (A.12)
βEC = log2
[
2
εEC
]
/nPP, (A.13)
βPA = 2 log2
[
1
εPA
]
/nPP, (A.14)
where the respective ε-parameters specify the confidence interval. For the presented
implementation, the key length after parameter estimation nPP = βest nSIFT equals the sifted
key rate as no bit values are revealed for estimating Q. Instead, the errors are measured by
comparing the original bit string with the corrected one, which limits εEC to the confidence
interval of subsequent error verification (εEC = εVER = 8× 10−11). The total security parameter
of the system is then fixed by the sum
εQKD = εsec = εVIS + εSmooth + εPA + 2 εVER + εMAC = 4× 10−9. (A.15)
Note the factor of two for εVER to account for failures in the QBER measure as well as the
verification step.
As a first input parameter we fix the number of bits nSIFT after sifting entering the further
distillation post-processing, which in our system is limited by the allocated hardware memory
to nSIFT = 995 328 bits. The number of useful detections in the monitoring detector nV (which
is used to estimate the visibility) is
nV = nSIFT
pDecoy + (
1+pDecoy)2
4
1− pDecoy
(1− tB)
tB
. (A.16)
Here, the first factor is the normalization since we use all useful monitor detections, the second
factor specifies the number of useful events due to decoy sequences and combinations across bit
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separations, and the third factor accounts for the beam splitting ratio. Any additional losses or
differences in the detection efficiencies between data and monitor detector can be incorporated
by a respective choice of the beam splitting ratio tB and detection efficiency ηD.
Note that an additional detector at the bright IF port is not necessary. Instead, we count
the number of detections Nint due to sequences which should destructively interfere and not be
detected in the dark port, and the number of detections Nnon due to non-interfering sequences.
Then, the visibility V is obtained by calculating
V = 1− Nint
Nnon
pnon
pint
, (A.17)
where pnon/pint is the ratio between the number of interfering and non-interfering sequences
sent.
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